creates a context for drug use, and how this context influences naloxone use and overdose experiences.
Introduction
National data indicate that deaths from drug overdose are increasing at an unprecedented rate. Of the 47,055 deaths nationally due to drug overdose (more deaths than those caused by motor vehicle accidents in 2014), 61% are due to nonmedical and illicit opioids [1] . These 28,647 opioidrelated deaths are triple the rate in 2000, and represent a 26% increase in heroin deaths and an 80% increase in nonmedical opioid deaths over 1 year (between 2013 and 2014; [1] ). These data indicate that while all opioid overdose deaths are increasing, this trend is driven by nonmedical opioids.
With so many deaths and an increasing trend, opioid overdose is a national epidemic that merits immediate action. Counties and states are largely responsible for addressing overdose-related mortality, with unique policies and programs that vary by location. For example, in areas that experienced high mortality due to intravenous heroin use, prevention programs were built into existing syringe exchanges (e.g., [2] ). Additional programs focus exclusively on overdose education and naloxone distribution to combat the mortality associated with opioid overdose.
effective largely depends on whether the medication is given in a timely manner, providing a window of opportunity to reverse the overdose and save the individual's life. In addition, naloxone has no abuse potential [3] .
Naloxone's ability to reverse overdose and prevent the associated mortality positions it as a critical tool in combating the opioid overdose epidemic. Public health officials have begun programs to expand naloxone access (e.g., [4] ) and regulatory changes have taken effect to facilitate this. What was once only available to paramedics, now is available to a wider range of emergency response personnel as well as 'lay people,' including opioid users, concerned significant others, and citizens in general [5] . Between 2010 and 2015, across the US, there was a dramatic increase in legislation that allow for naloxone prescription and distribution, as well as 'Good Samaritan Laws' that protect wellmeaning individuals who administer naloxone or call for emergency services [5] .
This expanded access is important because drug use is a social activity. Most heroin overdoses occur with other individuals in attendance; estimates for witnessing an overdose fall between 56% [6] and 85% [7] of heroin users. These overdoses result in mortality in part because the witnesses lack access to naloxone and fellow users are reticent to contact emergency services [8] . Most often users delay or do not call for help because they do not want to incur criminal charges or face police response [6] . This concern can be addressed when police engage in positive practices. For example, research has indicated a significant interaction between fear of arrest and previous exposure to police, such that fear of police was reduced if the individual had witnessed the police at the scene of an overdose [9] . Thus, positive policing practices in combination with 'good Samaritan laws' allow police to act as an important source of access to naloxone in the community.
The Administration of Naloxone by Police and Fire Personnel
Emergency responders who first arrive at the scene of an overdose are an important source of naloxone for several reasons. First, as mentioned previously, naloxone is only effective if administered in time; the sooner an individual is given naloxone, the better the chance of survival. As police officers or firefighters often are first on the scene [10, 11] , they represent an important leverage point for naloxone distribution.
Further, emergency responders who can administer naloxone have been systematically trained and provisioned as a part of a larger hierarchy of naloxone access. While friends and family can be important naloxone administrators, they are not uniformly given naloxone training and access. Friends and family may elect to carry naloxone in some localities, but do not represent the systematic, organized, and linked presence of emergency responders.
States and counties are individually addressing which emergency responders are equipped with naloxone. Nationally, only paramedics have naloxone administration as part of their scope of practice; however, there are 10-times as many police as paramedics and they are often the first on scene after a 911 call [11] . The large number of and immediate response by police means they can be an excellent route for administering naloxone when responding to overdose Davis et al. described police officers and firefighters as integral to public health through their roles in public safety [12] . There is limited but persuasive research that supports the idea that police and fire personnel can effectively administer naloxone. For example, Fisher, O'Donnell and colleagues [13] found that police officers/firefighters were able to accurately recognize overdose and administer naloxone. However, this study is limited by the brief nature of the report form that did not account for scene characteristics (e.g., drug(s) indicated, location of overdose), officer actions (e.g., whether the officer used a sternal rub or engaged in Cardio-Pulmonary Respiration; CPR), or specific naloxone administration characteristics (e.g., number of and response time for the naloxone dose(s)). In addition, only one area police agency implemented the naloxone distribution program, unlike the present work which examines a Countywide naloxone distribution program, across more than 23 police and fire agencies.
Police on scene at an overdose may also address a primary concern with naloxone distribution programs. That is, an apprehension about whether naloxone administration causes precipitated withdrawal, in which an individual become combative or angry. Davis, Ruiz and colleagues [12] contend that this is a major concern and poses a risk to those at the scene. In addition, Banta-Green, Beletsky [10] note that a majority of officers feel that it is important they are at the scene to protect emergency medical personnel. It is unclear whether officers' concerns are based on frequent experiences with individuals becoming aggressive/ combative after overdose, or if such experiences are more limited and only related to perceptions and stereotypes about individuals who overdose. To address this gap, the present research examines whether precipitated withdrawal is present and/or common in police and fire naloxone administration reports.
The Role of Place
Beyond addressing the mortality associated with opioid overdose, police/fire naloxone administration can provide important information about the nature of overdose, including demographic characteristics and geographic patterns. Emerging work has indicated geographic patterns in opioid mortality; what was once confined to urban locations is now wide-spread across urban, suburban, and rural areas [14] . Understanding these patterns will help prevention and intervention efforts, as well as provide important information on the individuals who are succumbing to the opioid overdose epidemic.
The Current Study
Given the limited research on the role of police and fire personnel in providing naloxone to address opioid overdoses, we examined opioid overdose reports (OORs) from a single county (Erie) in northwestern New York State. Reports were submitted to the Erie County Department of Health during a 2-year period (July 2014 through June 2016). The data represent a county-wide naloxone distribution program across more than 23 police and fire agencies that include urban, suburban and rural areas, with a total population of 920,000 (CENSUS, 2010).
This descriptive study aimed to use police and fire naloxone administration reports to understand the characteristics of opioid overdose reversal. Specifically, we will describe the demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age) of those who overdose; characterize the naloxone administration, including the individual's disposition after naloxone administration and the occurrence of precipitated withdrawal. To characterize the role of place in opioid overdose, we geocoded the locations/ZIP codes in which the overdoses occurred, thereby providing spatial depiction of opioid overdose in the region.
Methods Procedures
The present research uses secondary analysis of OORs to understand the demographics, characteristics, and naloxone administration by police and fire agencies in Erie County, NY. Trainings began in February 2014 with the Buffalo Police Department. The Buffalo Fire Department and additional agencies began trainings and carrying naloxone in spring and summer of 2014 (except for four suburban locations).
Trainings reviewed symptoms of overdose, with an emphasis on slow/no pulse, slow/no breathing, and unresponsive subject. Police officers/firefighters were also taught how to assemble and administer the naloxone intranasally, using an atomizer. Instruction also indicated when to re-administer if the subject did not regain consciousness within 2-3 min after initial administration. At the conclusion of training, each police officer/firefighter was given an overdose response kit with two doses of intranasal naloxone, as well as the intranasal atomizer, gloves, and an instruction card. All agencies receive naloxone from the New York State Department of Health.
Police and fire are required to complete an OOR whenever they administer naloxone while on duty. These reports collect data about the overdose, including: date; location of overdose (i.e., ZIP-code); demographics (e.g., age, gender), police reported nature of overdose (e.g., drugs used, disposition of patient upon arrival), administration of naloxone (e.g., number of vials used, patient's disposition after administration), and outcome of case (e.g., patient survival, transportation to hospital). The police officer/ firefighter who administered naloxone completes a paperand-pencil OOR and submits it to the ECDOH on a rolling basis. The ECDOH then sent OORs to the research team; reports from July 2014 through July 2016 were included in this analysis.
Data Management and Analytic Plan
OOR data were entered and managed using REDCap (Research Electronic Data Capture), a secure, web-based application designed by Vanderbilt University under contract from the NIH [15] . REDCap tools are hosted by the University at Buffalo to support data capture for research studies, and provide an intuitive interface for validated data entry, as well as audit trails and data export to statistical packages [15] . Research staff dual-entered data from the original paper forms into REDCap. Data were compared, and any discrepancies between two entries were reviewed and compared to the original form; once this was complete, data were merged and finalized. The University at Buffalo Institutional Review Board determined the present work was not human subjects' research due to the de-identified nature of the reports.
Descriptive statistics were used to characterize the demographic characteristics of those who overdose as well as to characterize naloxone administration. ZIP code data were geocoded and matched to the corresponding ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA). US Census data (2010) for adults age 18 years and older were used for the population size in these analyses. Population rates were determined based on the number of overdose reversal attempts in each ZCTA by the population age 18 and older (within that ZCTA). Finally, ZCTA populations were specific to Erie County; that is, if a ZCTA crossed between two counties, the population for that ZCTA only included those census blocks for the ZCTA within Erie County and did not include any population that fell in census blocks outside of the county. Rates were ranked and mapped by quantile using ArcGIS 10.2 geographic information system software.
Results

Reversal Attempts: Demographics
Of the 800 reversal attempts between July 2014 and July 2016, the majority were male (70.3%) and had an average age of 31.4 years (SD = 10.3). There was a wide range of ages, from 15 to 71 years. Of all reversal attempts, heroin was the primary drug indicated by responding police officers/firefighters, based on scene observation and drug user disclosure. Polydrug use was indicated in a majority of cases (e.g., heroin and alcohol were both observed on scene). Additional substances are presented in Table 1 .
Disposition on Arrival of Police and Fire Personnel
The majority of drug users (97.5%) were unresponsive or responsive but sedated upon police officer/firefighter arrival. As instructed in training sessions, police officers/firefighters checked the individual's breathing and pulse. Breathing was absent or slow in 92% of respondents upon police officer/ firefighter arrival. As overdose mortality occurs primarily because of depressed breathing, this is an important indicator for naloxone administration. The police officer/firefighter also indicated the drug user's pulse on arrival. Nearly half of respondents had a slow or no pulse (46.8%), although police officers/firefighters did not check the individual's pulse in a quarter of the cases. Additional subject disposition results are presented in Table 2 .
Responses to Naloxone
Of all reversal attempts, 81.6% were successfully reversed (n = 653). The remaining attempts were either unsuccessful (6.3%) or unknown (12.0%), meaning care of the individual was transferred to Emergency Medical Services (EMS) without the police officer/firefighter knowing if the individual survived the overdose. Police officers/firefighters administered 1.76 naloxone doses, per drug user, on average (SD = 0.72). There was a wide range of doses administered, from one to six doses. Though each kit contains two doses, additional police officers/firefighters on scene or occasionally EMS arrival provided additional doses that were reported on the OORs and accounts for the up to six doses administered on scene. In rare instances, reports indicated that additional naloxone was supplied by laypeople at the scene.
Response times to naloxone varied, with 26.6% responding within 3 min and an additional 21.7% responding within 5 min. Approximately 22% of drug users did not respond to the police/fire naloxone administration. Many of the individuals who did not respond to police/fire naloxone administration were unsuccessful (22.9%) or the outcome was unknown (20.7%). Although half of those who were unresponsive to police officers/firefighters naloxone administration were revived upon EMS arrival on scene (56.4%). Additional results for response time are presented in Table 3 . Of the drug users who did respond to naloxone, some were 'dope sick' (12.9%) or vomited (4.9%), but very few experienced seizures or respiratory distress (3.4%). The majority of were responsive and alert (19.9%) or sedated (34.0%) after the administration. Very few individuals became angry or combative (6.3%). Additional results for naloxone response can be found in Table 3 . Figure 1 presents the geographic distribution of naloxone administration rates by police and fire agencies. The highest distribution of rates was in the City of Buffalo, although there were notably high areas in suburban and rural areas. The highest 25% of administration rates fell within the range of 19.4-84.3 per 10,000 population, and were within an urban area (City of Buffalo). First ring suburbs as well as rural areas within the southern portion of Erie County experienced the next highest 25% of rates, ranging from 9.5 to 19.4 per 10,000 population. Second ring suburban and rural areas had the lower rates, although not all areas had overdose reversal attempts and/or did not participate in the police/fire naloxone administration program. Within the urban area, there were uniformly high rates (Fig. 1, inset ). The highest rates are shown along the waterfront area (14207, 14203) as well as the inner-city core (14202). These areas also align with major roads and highways.
Reversal Attempt Rates and Associated Geographic Distribution
Discussion
Overall, these results indicate that police and fire naloxone administration is successful; for example, the large number of reversals (82% or n = 610) indicates that police and fire are reducing opioid overdose mortality. In addition, results suggest that police and fire personnel are effectively evaluating the scene upon arrival at an overdose and are administering naloxone within the recommended indications. However, the success of this program should not eliminate the subsequent response by EMS. Our data indicate that more than half of those who did not respond to police officer/firefighter naloxone administration were revived when EMS arrived on scene and administered intravenous (IV) naloxone. Therefore, the police officers and firefighters timely response was supported by EMTs in the cases that required additional doses of naloxone for overdose reversal.
There is a concern that when someone is revived from an overdose they may be dangerous or combative at the scene [12, 16] . Naloxone causes precipitated withdrawal for the person experiencing an overdose, and this may cause the individual to become aggressive. However, our results do not support this conclusion. Our findings indicate that less than five percent of the sample became aggressive or combative. This is an important finding given the concern in the literature that responders could find themselves in a dangerous situation when responding to an overdose.
The present results are driven by heroin consumption; the overwhelming majority of reversal attempts occurred with heroin as the indicated drug (heroin could also contain fentanyl). This is in-line with the sharp increase in heroin use and overdose seen nationally [1] . However, despite this increase in national deaths due to heroin, the majority of opioid overdose deaths are still associated with nonmedical opioids [1] . Our results differ from this trend; relatively few overdoses (<10%) in the present research were exclusively due to nonmedical opioids. It is possible that this region has seen an expedited transition from nonmedical to illicit opioids. Other research has documented that users transition from nonmedical to heroin when it is easier or less expensive to obtain [17] [18] [19] . In 2013, New York State implemented a prescription monitoring program which likely limited access to licit opioids [20] . Thus, the expedited transition from nonmedical to illicit opioid overdose in this region may indicate what other areas could experience as additional prescription monitoring programs are implemented.
The naloxone administration rates were distributed across urban, suburban, and rural areas. The distribution across different geographic areas indicated that opioid overdose was 
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The highest rates are in the urban areas, however, some of those rates are artificially high because the population that lives in those areas is relatively low. For example, the 14203 ZIP code had a rate in the top 25%, but that area is composed mostly of waterfront, green space, industry, and highway. There is very little residential housing in that area; as such, the large number of overdoses by the relatively small population in that ZCTA (the population for 14203 is 1144 people age 18 and older) resulted in a large naloxone administration rate. These high rates of overdose in low-population, urban communities indicate that people are coming to urban areas to purchase and/or use and overdose on opioids, but reside elsewhere.
The migration to purchase and use opioids in the urban setting is further supported by the high overdose reversal rate in the 14213 ZIP code. Anecdotally, this area of the city has historically been a large opioid drug market, and thus one would expect that the rate would be high. These results suggest the persistence of traditional locations of drug distribution and use, despite the evolving spatial pattern to more suburban and rural locations. Thus, although there is a change in where users come from, locations where people acquire the drugs are also the same locations as people overdosing, since many use so quickly after purchasing the drugs.
This study has some limitations. First, as this is de-identified, secondary data, we could not determine whether each overdose was a unique individual, or if the same individual overdosed multiple times. Further, the drug(s) of overdose were not confirmed with chemical analysis, and thus likely under-represent the number of overdoses associated with substances such as powdered fentanyl. However, as the area under study has a 'Good Samaritan laws' in place, drug users were likely more truthful when disclosing substances used because they were protected from criminal prosecution for the substances in their possession.
Finally, the geographic data were at ZIP code level and did not include point-level data, such as the address of the overdose. This did not allow us to examine geographic differences at a more fine-grain level, such as census blocks, or use point-pattern analysis. However, ZIP codes are drawn based on community factors [22, 23] and thus provide an excellent way to look at community trends in an area. In addition, the City of Buffalo is an older metropolitan area with low overall physical growth. As such, ZIP codes and ZCTAs closely align and minimize any error that would occur in areas with extensive metropolitan growth. Therefore, these results indicate which communities are experiencing higher rates of opioid overdose reversal and provide important targets for future programs. Our results have implications for future research, which should examine differences in location of overdose compared to location of individual's residence.
In conclusion, the present work indicates that in this region, police officers and firefighters are successfully administering naloxone at overdoses; a large number of individuals have been saved during the program's relatively short duration. The average individual who experienced an overdose was a male in his early 30s, who required just fewer than two vials of naloxone for revival. Overall, the reversals were well-tolerated, with few negative side effects. Finally, we see that the rates of naloxone administration were concentrated in urban areas, but are wide-spread throughout suburban and rural locations as well. Some of these urban overdoses are due to individuals migrating in and overdosing in low-population areas. Understanding where these individuals are coming from is an important next step for future research.
